No debate about Ram or Ram Sethu?
-------------
P.P.Sudhakaran.
In ‘Reason v faith: secularism at stake’, Aparna Chandra (Open Page, 07.10.2007) says:
1. The dispute over the proposed Sethusamudram project has unnecessarily degenerated into a debate over the existence of Ram and the origin of Ram Sethu that masks the real issue of the project’s impact on marine ecology and on local fishing community. It has to be engaged with constructively since it holds immense consequences for the nature of Indian polity.
2. The debate over the project is seen framed as a battle between reason and faith while the real issue is resolving the meaning of secularism. Secularism, on the one hand, is a positive freedom to hold any or no religious belief and, on the other, a limitation on state action. The state cannot interfere in the realm of religious faith because religious faith is a “protected territory”, and has “no justification, reason, convenience or public interest for using its resources” even to debate the issues of Ram’s historicity or the origin of Ram Sethu. The burden of proof for a breach of the “protective barrier of faith” will be on the state. Even “economic convenience” is not a good enough reason for a breach.
As can be seen, the above arguments work at cross-purposes, the first force-opening a debate and the second fore-closing it. Let me elaborate.
1. The writer says that the project may damage marine ecology and impact on the environment and on the life of the dependent people. Should not these be engaged constructively through debates? Should not the State be forced to explain the pros and cons of the project and be permitted to go ahead only if found economically and environmentally viable and stopped if found non-viable? Though she concedes that they are the ‘real issue’, she avoids demanding the obvious, and instead says later on that even “economic convenience” is not a good enough reason for the State to interfere.
2. She says that the debate over the project ought to engage only the question of secularism and none other, including the historicity of Ram and the origin of Ram Sethu, as they all belong to a “territory” protected from the State. What should the State do when two different communities confront each other, as is happening in Baba Budangiri and so many other places, or when tensions within a community threaten civil life?
3. The writer says that secularism gives us freedom to hold any or no religious belief. How can such a freedom create a common ‘territory’ unless the individuals voluntarily forfeit them? Have all the Hindus forfeited their secular rights for creating a common territory?
4. A ‘protected territory’ ought to be a demarcated area with a custodian. Which are its boundaries, who have demarcated them, who are its custodian? We all know the answers. But, instead of repeating a truism, I would invite the writer and her ilk to initiate or join a debate about whether the innumerable caste-based religious beliefs and practices that were the hall-mark of ‘Hinduism’ till some decades back have already become a single religion, and whether its ‘territory’ is not like that of the fabled ‘empire’ of Bahadur Shah Zafar.
5. Finally, why should we keep Ram’s historicity under a wrap? Why should we keep the difference between history and mythology blurred? History and mythology are ways of relating to the past but in two different ways and for two different purposes. History needs proof, mythology does not. For history, it is not enough that an event is ‘happenable’ but should actually have happened. A myth, even if ‘happenable’, will not be history unless it is supported by evidence. A myth, like historical romance, may mention events, places and individuals that history also mentions but still will not be history unless it passes the test of history. Secular historiography has already studied the question of Ram’s historicity extensively, and its verdict is loud and clear – Ram the God will not figure in Indian history as a historical person. For that matter, history does not endorse any god as a historical person. Swasthi. Swasthi.
Sunday, October 14, 2007
Saturday, October 13, 2007
Nuclear Deal and the BJP
The story of the Indo – US Nuclear Deal strongly resembles the story of the ‘donkey, the father and the son’ except for the role of the BJP. In the original story, those who commented about the donkey were different groups of loafers standing at different places along the road. Here the BJP is travelling along with the trio and offering all the conflicting comments along the journey. As in the original story, this time also the concern is not about the donkey. The BJP simply does not want the journey to finish, which actually they had begun, because, now they are not the drivers. And we all know too well how the story and the donkey will end!
P.P.Sudhakaran
Bangalore.
301, East Mansion,
No.2, Hutchins Road,
Cooke Town,
Bangalore 5।Ph. 080 25467483.
Letter sent to The Hindu on 14.10.2007
The story of the Indo – US Nuclear Deal strongly resembles the story of the ‘donkey, the father and the son’ except for the role of the BJP. In the original story, those who commented about the donkey were different groups of loafers standing at different places along the road. Here the BJP is travelling along with the trio and offering all the conflicting comments along the journey. As in the original story, this time also the concern is not about the donkey. The BJP simply does not want the journey to finish, which actually they had begun, because, now they are not the drivers. And we all know too well how the story and the donkey will end!
P.P.Sudhakaran
Bangalore.
301, East Mansion,
No.2, Hutchins Road,
Cooke Town,
Bangalore 5।Ph. 080 25467483.
Letter sent to The Hindu on 14.10.2007
Friday, October 12, 2007
Meanings of Indian Secularism
By a Constitutional amendment in 1976, India became a 'secular' State. But this is only in name. Neither the Indian State nor the Indian society is secular in the real sense of the term. 'Secularism' as is understood in the world context is a far cry from the 'secularism' that is being practised by the State or articulated by the political parties, whether they are of the left, centre or the right. Separation of governance from religion is now observed more in its breach than in its observance.
The mention of ‘Secular’ was missed at the time the Indian Constitution was framed in 1950, notwithstanding the still fresh communal conflagrations of the Partition riots of 1947 – 48 and the murder of Gandhi by an ultra-Hindu ideologue. This was sought to be corrected by the 42nd amendment in 1976. Outwardly it was a good gesture. But, one would never know whether the movers and supporters of the amendment had really thought that India would thereafter at least become a secular state. Looking back, one may feel that it was a desperate move to smother communal passions that were already flaring up in various parts of the country. But, the forces opposed to secularism have only flourished after 1976. Political parties vying with each other to make short-term electoral gains have abused the concept of secularism with utter cynicism ever since the amendment.
If at all Indian polity and society were ever secular, it was in the early years of independence, during the early phase of Jawaharlal Nehru’s Prime-Ministership, when India was not a ‘secular’ State. Then there were free rational discourses in the media and in academic circles. Artistic expressions were not stifled under the pretext of offending religious sentiments. But from the eighties onwards, the scientific temper and the secular spirit withdrew from the public domain under a concerted onslaught by some fundamentalist political and academic propagandists and the willing acquiescence by the parties in power. Championing communal causes became respectable. Those who carried out communal pogroms became heroes and won elections. Things deteriorated to such an extent that a party that came into power riding a wave of communal frenzy took upon itself the responsibility of building a temple while vouching for true secularism and accusing others of ‘pseudo-secularism’ all along.
Why has this happened or is happening? May be there are quite a number of reasons.
1. Whatever the partisan historians might claim, the history of Hindu-Muslim relations in medieval India had been a mixed one with an interlacing of tensions and co-operations. In modern times, the highest watermark of communal harmony was attained during the freedom movement under the leadership of Gandhi. That was but only a welcome aberration.
2. India has been found to be the third most religious country in the world by a 2004 survey done by BBC. This passion for one’s religion is not at all conducive for secularism.
3. India with the second largest population in the world is perhaps the one State in the world with the largest number of religions. This is a fertile ground to sow and reap a rich harvest of communal tensions.
4. Indian democracy follows universal adult franchise. A large majority of its voters do not join or follow regular political discussions. It is easier to move them on issues they already have an identity of or are already involved in. Religion and caste are two such ready-made identities. Politicians relentlessly exploit this resource. This apolitical group-formation is known as ‘vote bank’ in Indian political parlance.
5. Statistics will show that the Hindus form about 80% of the Indian population. The present spate of Hindu communalism is spurred by the hope that if the Hindu vote bank could be galvanized, a Hindu party could be in power in perpetuity. But, the caste divisions within the Hindu community are stalling this unification plans. The reservations of seats in the legislatures and for government jobs for the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes, who are counted as Hindus, further complicate the unification plans. The fruits of a Hindu unity, if achieved, are so tempting that the efforts at communalizing all the Hindus will keep on driving Indian politics for quite a long time to come.
6. The Indian politicians in course of time have become adept at the blame-game. Even while playing the communal card, they will call themselves ‘secular’ and their adversaries ‘pseudo-secular. The worst case is that of a party that stridently claims to represent, protect and propagate a certain religious ideology and culture calling itself ‘secular’ and its adversaries ‘pseudo-secular’.
At present, 'secularism' is a shibboleth that has lost both its meaning and its context in Indian polity as well as society.
By a Constitutional amendment in 1976, India became a 'secular' State. But this is only in name. Neither the Indian State nor the Indian society is secular in the real sense of the term. 'Secularism' as is understood in the world context is a far cry from the 'secularism' that is being practised by the State or articulated by the political parties, whether they are of the left, centre or the right. Separation of governance from religion is now observed more in its breach than in its observance.
The mention of ‘Secular’ was missed at the time the Indian Constitution was framed in 1950, notwithstanding the still fresh communal conflagrations of the Partition riots of 1947 – 48 and the murder of Gandhi by an ultra-Hindu ideologue. This was sought to be corrected by the 42nd amendment in 1976. Outwardly it was a good gesture. But, one would never know whether the movers and supporters of the amendment had really thought that India would thereafter at least become a secular state. Looking back, one may feel that it was a desperate move to smother communal passions that were already flaring up in various parts of the country. But, the forces opposed to secularism have only flourished after 1976. Political parties vying with each other to make short-term electoral gains have abused the concept of secularism with utter cynicism ever since the amendment.
If at all Indian polity and society were ever secular, it was in the early years of independence, during the early phase of Jawaharlal Nehru’s Prime-Ministership, when India was not a ‘secular’ State. Then there were free rational discourses in the media and in academic circles. Artistic expressions were not stifled under the pretext of offending religious sentiments. But from the eighties onwards, the scientific temper and the secular spirit withdrew from the public domain under a concerted onslaught by some fundamentalist political and academic propagandists and the willing acquiescence by the parties in power. Championing communal causes became respectable. Those who carried out communal pogroms became heroes and won elections. Things deteriorated to such an extent that a party that came into power riding a wave of communal frenzy took upon itself the responsibility of building a temple while vouching for true secularism and accusing others of ‘pseudo-secularism’ all along.
Why has this happened or is happening? May be there are quite a number of reasons.
1. Whatever the partisan historians might claim, the history of Hindu-Muslim relations in medieval India had been a mixed one with an interlacing of tensions and co-operations. In modern times, the highest watermark of communal harmony was attained during the freedom movement under the leadership of Gandhi. That was but only a welcome aberration.
2. India has been found to be the third most religious country in the world by a 2004 survey done by BBC. This passion for one’s religion is not at all conducive for secularism.
3. India with the second largest population in the world is perhaps the one State in the world with the largest number of religions. This is a fertile ground to sow and reap a rich harvest of communal tensions.
4. Indian democracy follows universal adult franchise. A large majority of its voters do not join or follow regular political discussions. It is easier to move them on issues they already have an identity of or are already involved in. Religion and caste are two such ready-made identities. Politicians relentlessly exploit this resource. This apolitical group-formation is known as ‘vote bank’ in Indian political parlance.
5. Statistics will show that the Hindus form about 80% of the Indian population. The present spate of Hindu communalism is spurred by the hope that if the Hindu vote bank could be galvanized, a Hindu party could be in power in perpetuity. But, the caste divisions within the Hindu community are stalling this unification plans. The reservations of seats in the legislatures and for government jobs for the Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes, who are counted as Hindus, further complicate the unification plans. The fruits of a Hindu unity, if achieved, are so tempting that the efforts at communalizing all the Hindus will keep on driving Indian politics for quite a long time to come.
6. The Indian politicians in course of time have become adept at the blame-game. Even while playing the communal card, they will call themselves ‘secular’ and their adversaries ‘pseudo-secular. The worst case is that of a party that stridently claims to represent, protect and propagate a certain religious ideology and culture calling itself ‘secular’ and its adversaries ‘pseudo-secular’.
At present, 'secularism' is a shibboleth that has lost both its meaning and its context in Indian polity as well as society.
Thursday, August 17, 2006
Saraswati Civilization: Some serious work
Dear List,
There are some serious studies also.
The following is the concluding part of ‘The Myth of Saraswati Civilization’ by Dr. R.C.Thakran of Delhi University from the book, Advances in History, eds. Kesavan Veluthat and P.P.Sudhakaran, Prof. M.P.Sridharan Memorial Trust, Calicut, 2003.
It is well known that the ancient-most remains of human habitation come from the south western parts of Bahawalpur. These are older than the early Harappan remains. On the basis of this evidence one can claim that this area was the cradle of the Harappan civilization and, therefore, this was in fact the Saraswati civilization which produced this civilization. But certain points need to be taken note of in this context for a better understanding of the process of development of this civilization. The first thing is that the remains of the Hakra and early Harappan phase have been gathered from the south western and north eastern parts of Bahawalpur respectively. Hence their influence zones are different. There is no regional overlap between the two. Secondly, only 3 sites have produced remains of the two. This rules out any possibility of appreciable stratigraphical continuity. Thirdly, there is an absence of cultural continuity. Fourthly, the Hakra culture is neither unique nor independent; it bears the influence of the contemporary and even the ancient cultures of the Indus Valley and beyond; their impact on it is quite obvious. Some of the places like Kile Ghul Mohammad in the Quetta Valley and Central Baluchistan, Gumla, and Mehrgarh in the Kacchi Valley of east-central Baluchistan are more ancient than these. Here, the cultural sequence is more ancient than in the Hakra. These also present a more systematic and continuous cultural growth . Hence, the process of cultural growth seems to have begun in these very areas rather than in the Bahawalpur zone; and as one moves from the western parts towards Bahawalpur, Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab and western Uttar Pradesh, the cultural antiquity recedes consistently. Therefore, neither was the Hakra culture the ancient most, nor the Bahawalpur zone the central point for the evolution of the Harappa civilization; nor any of the sites from Bahawalpur and from Indian territory as rich as Mehrgarh in terms of cultural antiquity and systematic cultural growth. Keeping in view all these points, there is no point in renaming the Harappa civilization as the Saraswati civilization.
Notes and References
1. M.R. Mughal ‘Recent Archaeological Researches in Cholistan Desert’, in G.L. Possehl, Ed., Harappan Civilization, New Delhi 1982, pp.85-96. Also in
S.P. Gupta, Ed., An Archaeological Tour Along The Ghaggar-Hakra River,
Meerut, 1989, pp.107-125.
2. Ibid, 120.
3. R.C. Thakran, ‘Protohistoric Settlement Patterns in Haryana’, in K.M. Shrimali,
Ed., Reason And Archaeology, Delhi, 1998, pp.29-62. R.C.Thakran, ‘Implications of Partition on the Protohistoric Investigations in the Ghaggar-Ganga Basins’ In Social Scientist, 28, Jan-Feb, New Delhi 2000, pp.57-62.
4. B.S.R. Babu, ‘Mandoli – A late Harappan Settlement in Delhi’, in C. Margabandhu and K.S. Ramachandran, Eds., Spectrum of Indian Culture (Prof. S.B. Deo felicitation volume), Delhi 1996, pp. 98-104; B.S.R. Babu, ‘1994-95 Excavations at Bhorgarh’, Puratatva, 25, New Delhi 1994, pp.89-93.
5. R.C. Thakran, ‘Protohistoric Settlement Pattern in Punjab’, in Irfan Habib and K.M. Shrimali, Eds., Archaeology And Culture, Delhi, (forthcoming); R.C. Thakran, ‘An Assessment of the Role of Rivers in Promoting Settlement Patterns in Punjab’, in Social Scientist, New Delhi, (forthcoming).
6. J.P. Joshi et al., ‘Indus civilization: A Reconsideration on the Basis of Distribution Maps’, in B.B. Lal and S.P. Gupta, Eds., Frontiers of Indus Civilization, New Delhi, 1984, pp.511-30.
7. A. Ghosh, ‘The Rajputana Desert – Its Archaeological Aspects’, Bulletin of the National Institute of Sciences of India, 1, 1952, pp.37-42.
8. IAR 1960-61, p.31; 1961-62, pp.39-44; 1962-63, pp.20-31; 1963-64, pp.30-39; 1964-65, pp.35-39; 1965-66.pp.38-41; 1966-67, pp.31-33; 1967-68, pp.42-45; 1968-69, pp.28-32.
9. B.B. Lal, The Earliest Civilization of South Asia, Aryan Books International, New Delhi, 1997.
10. IAR, 1977-78, pp.46-47.
11. Lupta Saraswati Nadi, Shri Baba Sahab Apte Smarak Samiti, Nagpur, 1992.
12. IAR 1961-69, p.31.
13. R.C. Thakran, 1998, pp.29-62.
14. Ibid.
15. Census of India: Regional Divisions of India – A Cartographic Analysis, I, IV, Haryana, New Delhi, 1981, p.21.
16. R.C. Thakran, 1998, pp.29-62.
17. R.C. Thakran, Social Scientist, (forthcoming).
18. J.P. Joshi, 1984, pp.511-30.
There are some serious studies also.
The following is the concluding part of ‘The Myth of Saraswati Civilization’ by Dr. R.C.Thakran of Delhi University from the book, Advances in History, eds. Kesavan Veluthat and P.P.Sudhakaran, Prof. M.P.Sridharan Memorial Trust, Calicut, 2003.
It is well known that the ancient-most remains of human habitation come from the south western parts of Bahawalpur. These are older than the early Harappan remains. On the basis of this evidence one can claim that this area was the cradle of the Harappan civilization and, therefore, this was in fact the Saraswati civilization which produced this civilization. But certain points need to be taken note of in this context for a better understanding of the process of development of this civilization. The first thing is that the remains of the Hakra and early Harappan phase have been gathered from the south western and north eastern parts of Bahawalpur respectively. Hence their influence zones are different. There is no regional overlap between the two. Secondly, only 3 sites have produced remains of the two. This rules out any possibility of appreciable stratigraphical continuity. Thirdly, there is an absence of cultural continuity. Fourthly, the Hakra culture is neither unique nor independent; it bears the influence of the contemporary and even the ancient cultures of the Indus Valley and beyond; their impact on it is quite obvious. Some of the places like Kile Ghul Mohammad in the Quetta Valley and Central Baluchistan, Gumla, and Mehrgarh in the Kacchi Valley of east-central Baluchistan are more ancient than these. Here, the cultural sequence is more ancient than in the Hakra. These also present a more systematic and continuous cultural growth . Hence, the process of cultural growth seems to have begun in these very areas rather than in the Bahawalpur zone; and as one moves from the western parts towards Bahawalpur, Rajasthan, Haryana, Punjab and western Uttar Pradesh, the cultural antiquity recedes consistently. Therefore, neither was the Hakra culture the ancient most, nor the Bahawalpur zone the central point for the evolution of the Harappa civilization; nor any of the sites from Bahawalpur and from Indian territory as rich as Mehrgarh in terms of cultural antiquity and systematic cultural growth. Keeping in view all these points, there is no point in renaming the Harappa civilization as the Saraswati civilization.
Notes and References
1. M.R. Mughal ‘Recent Archaeological Researches in Cholistan Desert’, in G.L. Possehl, Ed., Harappan Civilization, New Delhi 1982, pp.85-96. Also in
S.P. Gupta, Ed., An Archaeological Tour Along The Ghaggar-Hakra River,
Meerut, 1989, pp.107-125.
2. Ibid, 120.
3. R.C. Thakran, ‘Protohistoric Settlement Patterns in Haryana’, in K.M. Shrimali,
Ed., Reason And Archaeology, Delhi, 1998, pp.29-62. R.C.Thakran, ‘Implications of Partition on the Protohistoric Investigations in the Ghaggar-Ganga Basins’ In Social Scientist, 28, Jan-Feb, New Delhi 2000, pp.57-62.
4. B.S.R. Babu, ‘Mandoli – A late Harappan Settlement in Delhi’, in C. Margabandhu and K.S. Ramachandran, Eds., Spectrum of Indian Culture (Prof. S.B. Deo felicitation volume), Delhi 1996, pp. 98-104; B.S.R. Babu, ‘1994-95 Excavations at Bhorgarh’, Puratatva, 25, New Delhi 1994, pp.89-93.
5. R.C. Thakran, ‘Protohistoric Settlement Pattern in Punjab’, in Irfan Habib and K.M. Shrimali, Eds., Archaeology And Culture, Delhi, (forthcoming); R.C. Thakran, ‘An Assessment of the Role of Rivers in Promoting Settlement Patterns in Punjab’, in Social Scientist, New Delhi, (forthcoming).
6. J.P. Joshi et al., ‘Indus civilization: A Reconsideration on the Basis of Distribution Maps’, in B.B. Lal and S.P. Gupta, Eds., Frontiers of Indus Civilization, New Delhi, 1984, pp.511-30.
7. A. Ghosh, ‘The Rajputana Desert – Its Archaeological Aspects’, Bulletin of the National Institute of Sciences of India, 1, 1952, pp.37-42.
8. IAR 1960-61, p.31; 1961-62, pp.39-44; 1962-63, pp.20-31; 1963-64, pp.30-39; 1964-65, pp.35-39; 1965-66.pp.38-41; 1966-67, pp.31-33; 1967-68, pp.42-45; 1968-69, pp.28-32.
9. B.B. Lal, The Earliest Civilization of South Asia, Aryan Books International, New Delhi, 1997.
10. IAR, 1977-78, pp.46-47.
11. Lupta Saraswati Nadi, Shri Baba Sahab Apte Smarak Samiti, Nagpur, 1992.
12. IAR 1961-69, p.31.
13. R.C. Thakran, 1998, pp.29-62.
14. Ibid.
15. Census of India: Regional Divisions of India – A Cartographic Analysis, I, IV, Haryana, New Delhi, 1981, p.21.
16. R.C. Thakran, 1998, pp.29-62.
17. R.C. Thakran, Social Scientist, (forthcoming).
18. J.P. Joshi, 1984, pp.511-30.
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